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Abstract 
Distribution networks have been traditionally conceived for 
transporting electricity downstream into low voltage demand 
nodes. However, the connection of significant amounts of 
distributed generation may reverse this condition, resulting in 
distribution nodes exporting power to other parts of the 
network. The current planning standard of the UK distribution 
networks (Engineering recommendation P2/6) requires making 
available sufficient capacity and redundancy for downstream 
flows under peak demand levels. However, it does not 
explicitly consider the implications of DG-mediated flow 
reversals that may cause flow constraints under circuit outage 
conditions. Relying on a Monte Carlo approach to sample wind 
and demand with adjustable correlations, this paper provides 
insights into the risks associated with an increase of variable 
distributed generation to the point where reverse flows may 
exceed the connection capacity under circuit outage conditions. 
Remote tripping schemes that disconnect distributed 
generators upon occurrence of a fault are explored to mitigate 
outage related costs. The latter strategy carries benefits but also 
novel risks in the form of a reliance on real-time 
communication and control, which may malfunction. It is 
shown that even unreliable corrective actions convey 
significant benefits to system reliability.  
1 Introduction 
Engineering recommendation P2 has governed the 
development of secure and reliable distribution networks in the 
UK since 1978 [5]. P2 is a deterministic security standard that, 
among other things, specifies how long it should take to restore 
the supply of power in the event of single and double circuit 
outages, depending on the size of the network as measured by 
the peak demand of that group of costumers. Traditionally the 
P2 security requirements have been met through network 
infrastructure redundancy [7], often resulting in large security-
driven investment costs [8]. 
A fundamental question regarding the evolution of the P2 
standard is whether it directs investments in an economically 
efficient manner, especially in the context of the rise of 
distributed generation (DG), non-network security 
technologies and the changing role of the demand. A number 
of changes have been made over the years, notably the 
introduction of P2/6 in 2006 [1, 4], which specifies a capacity 
value for distributed generation in order to defer network 
investments. Today, the standard addresses essential 
contributions of DG to be used in future network planning. 
However, the capacity requirements of P2/6 primarily conceive 
distribution networks for transporting electricity downstream 
into low voltage demand nodes. 
Unquestionably, the connection of significant amounts of 
distributed generation may reverse this condition, resulting in 
distribution nodes exporting power to other parts of the 
network. The variable nature of end-user loads and the 
variability of renewable sources of generation (e.g. wind or 
solar) in particular may translate into power flows dynamically 
reversing according to different operating conditions. In this 
scenario, DG-mediated flow reversals may cause flow 
constraints under circuit outage conditions. This situation is not 
explicitly considered in the planning standard of the UK 
distribution networks.  
It may not be economically justified to address the risk due to 
reverse power flows using traditional network reinforcements. 
Fortunately, other possibilities based on non-network 
technologies may represent an alternative for designing secure 
and reliable networks at reasonable cost. These corrective 
systems may rapidly reduce the exporting power flow when a 
circuit fault occurs, by for example disconnecting distributed 
generation. The objective of such a corrective security system 
is to avoid potential post-fault overloading in the remaining 
circuits. However, they may carry novel risks in the form of a 
reliance on real-time communication and control, which may 
malfunction and affect the overall reliability performance [6]. 
Corrective actions in the form of System Protection Schemes 
(SPS) have been generally applied to enhance the design and 
operation of the transmission networks [3]. Yet, further 
research needs to be performed in order to understand the 
benefits and risks of these schemes at the distribution level. 
This paper aims to provide insights into the risks associated 
with an increase of distributed generation to the point where 
reverse flows may exceed the connection capacity under circuit 
outage conditions. A year-round reliability analysis is 
performed in a simple distribution system with relatively large 
wind generators installed, where reverse flows may happen 
throughout the year. Historical wind speeds and demand are 
sampled randomly with definable correlation parameters. A 
simple fault and restoration model is used in order to quantify 
interruption costs associated with circuit outage scenarios 
under reverse flow conditions. Sensitivity analysis based on 
different values of Value of Lost Load and outage durations are 
performed. We then propose to mitigate the reverse-flow risks 
by a generation rejection scheme. Expected interruption costs 
are then computed for different redundant topologies and 
reliability levels of the protection system.  
2 Problem description and test system  
2.1 General characteristics 
The operational risks from DG-mediated reverse flows are 
illustrated in a simple model system. As illustrated in Fig.1, it 
is composed of a distribution system at 11kV connected to the 
rest of the network through two identical 132/11kV 
transformers with a capacity of 17MW each (only active power 
is considered). The distribution system has a significant 
amount of MV-connected wind power, composed of 4 sites 
with three 3MW wind turbines each for a total installed 
capacity of 36 MW. The wind speed at the distribution bus is 
modelled using three years (2003-2005) of historical hourly 
wind speed data from Crosby near Liverpool, which are 
translated to power using the wind-output power 
characteristics of a Vestas V90 wind turbine [9]. The demand 
group is composed of 15,000 costumers with an annual load 
profile constructed from the half-hourly Elexon Profile Class 1 
data, which defines average costumer loads for weekdays, 
Saturdays and Sundays in the five periods autumn, winter, 
spring, summer and high summer. To construct an annual load 
profile we assume that each period has 13 weeks, except for 
summer (8 weeks) and high summer (5 weeks).The minimum 
and maximum aggregated demand is 2.7 and 13.7 MW 
respectively.  
 
Figure 1: Test network. A failure in T2 (T1) in combination 
with reverse flows may overload T1 (T2). 
 
2.2 Fault and restoration model 
In our model, operating conditions with high wind speed and 
low-medium demand at the distribution bus result in power 
flowing upstream towards the rest of the network. As the 
transformers are identical, any reverse flows exceeding 17 MW 
(50% of the total capacity) place the system in a state where a 
fault in a single transformer results in overloading the 
remaining transformer. We assume that each transformer has a 
protective system that instantly disconnects it in case of 
overloading. The distribution system is assumed not to support 
islanding operation, so that transformer disconnections result 
in a loss of supply to all customers.  
When this situation occurs we assume that the distribution 
network operator (DNO) performs restorative actions 
composed of two processes as follows. The first process aims 
to restore the supply to the disconnected customers. After the 
cause of the problem has been identified (excessive reverse 
flows), the DNO disconnects the distributed generators and 
verifies if there are further problems in the network, before 
reconnecting the healthy transformer, thus reinstating the 
supply to the demand group. We assume that the DNO also 
reconnects 2 wind farms, which is the maximum wind capacity 
that can be reconnected without overloading the only 
remaining transformer in the system. This process is assumed 
to take up to 24 hours (the value used in this study). The other 
two wind farms remain disconnected from the distribution 
system in order to prevent excessive reverse power flows while 
the system is in the ‘N-1’ configuration. The second process 
involves repairing or replacing the faulty transformer, which is 
assumed to take 10 days by default. After the faulty 
transformer has been repaired or replaced, the remaining 
disconnected wind farms are reconnected to the system. At this 
point the network returns to normal operation. Single 
transformer faults are considered to occur randomly with a rate 
of 0.02 failures/year (one failure every 50 years).  
We further assume that the DNO preventively disconnects two 
wind farms after any single transformer fault – even when it 
does not trigger further disconnections. Doing so avoids 
overloads of the remaining transformer in service. The two 
wind farms are reconnected after the transformer has been 
repaired.  
Simultaneous single faults are neglected, but the model does 
include a common mode failure of both transformers (e.g. an 
external event that affects collocated transformers). Its rate of 
occurrence is assumed to be 1% of that of single transformer 
fault. Demand curtailment is valued at £30000/MWh [10], 
whereas wind curtailments are valued at £80/MWh (in line 
with combined feed-in and export tariffs). 
3 Random sampling and risk quantification 
Our probabilistic risk assessment is based on a state sampling 
Monte Carlo procedure in which wind power output and 
demand are sampled with optional dependencies amongst 
them. The expected yearly costs due to transformer outages is 
computed based on a simple fault model and impact 
computations. 
 
3.1 Sampling wind generation and demand 
Individual system states are characterised by randomly 
sampled wind turbine outputs and load levels, each with 
marginal distributions as described in section 2.1. However, 
the wind power produced at four neighbouring sites is not 
independent, and collectively these may be related to the 
demand level. Generating correlated random variables with 
arbitrary distributions is a hard problem in general, but as we 
are mostly interested in a qualitative assessment of the impact 
of dependencies the following simplified procedure can be 
used. We initially sample correlated random variates that are 
each distributed according to the standard normal distribution 
𝒩(0,1). Each of these (four for the wind speeds and one for 
the load) are subsequently transformed to have the correct 
marginal distributions using the probability integral transform, 
followed by an inverse probability integral transform with the 
historical distribution. Effectively, this procedure generates 
samples from a Gaussian copula model for wind and demand. 
Detailed steps are described below. 
The first step is to generate a correlated random sample 
𝑣1, … , 𝑣5 where each value has a standard normal marginal 
distribution 𝒩(0,1). For this we use the function mvnrnd of 
Matlab with sample mean 0 and a covariance matrix defined as 
 
 𝐶 =
(
 
 
1 𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤  𝜌𝑤,𝑑
𝜌𝑤 1 𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤  𝜌𝑤,𝑑
𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤 1 𝜌𝑤  𝜌𝑤,𝑑
𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤 𝜌𝑤 1  𝜌𝑤,𝑑
 𝜌𝑤,𝑑  𝜌𝑤,𝑑  𝜌𝑤,𝑑  𝜌𝑤,𝑑 1 )
 
 
           (1) 
  
 
Each element has a variance 1 and their mutual Pearson’s 
correlations are defined by the parameters 𝜌𝑤 ∈ [−1,1] 
(correlation between wind sites) and 𝜌𝑤,𝑑 ∈ [−1,1] 
(correlation between wind and demand levels). As an aside we 
note that not every combination of 𝜌𝑤 and 𝜌𝑤,𝑑 is permitted. 
The next step is to transform the values of the random sample 
to their target distributions. This is achieved by firstly 
converting 𝑣1, … , 𝑣5 into uniformly distributed variables 
between 0 and 1, using the probability integral transform 
(𝑢1, … , 𝑢5) = (𝐹𝒩(𝑣1), … , 𝐹𝒩(𝑣5)), where 𝐹𝒩 is the CDF of 
the standard normal distribution. This is followed by an inverse 
probability integral transform using the historical cumulative 
probability distributions here referred to as 𝐹𝑊 and 𝐹𝐷 for the 
wind speed and demand respectively. This way, we obtain a 
sample set (𝑤1, … , 𝑤4, 𝑑) = (𝐹𝑊
−1(𝑢1), … , 𝐹𝑊
−1(𝑢4), 𝐹𝐷
−1(𝑢5)) 
for the four wind speeds and demand. Finally, the wind speeds 
are converted into power generation based on interpolation of 
the power generation curve for the Vestas V90 3MW turbines, 
resulting in the final random sample (𝑔1, … , 𝑔4, 𝑑) = (?⃗?, 𝑑).  
 
3.2 Risk assessment model 
The samples produced with the method above produce a set of 
operating conditions for the system. These are used to estimate 
the risk associated with transformer faults. We consider the 
case where individual transformer faults occur very rarely, so 
that we may assume that individual transformer faults do not 
occur simultaneously. However, we allow for a common mode 
failure at the distribution bus which results in a simultaneous 
outage of both transformers. Under these considerations, the 
annual risk exposure is computed by multiplying the fault rates 
with the cost associated with that fault, averaged over the 
sampled set of operating conditions.  
cost = 2𝜆𝑠
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑋𝑠(?⃗?𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜆𝑐
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑋𝑐(?⃗?𝑖, 𝑑𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1         (2) 
  
where 𝜆𝑠 is the rate of individual transformer faults 
(occurrences/year) and 𝑋𝑠(?⃗?𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) computes the impact as a 
function of the sampled generation and load levels.  Similarly, 
𝜆𝑐 and 𝑋𝑐 are respectively the rate and impact of common 
mode faults. 𝑁 is the number of samples within the sample set. 
The impact 𝑋𝑠/𝑐(?⃗?𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) represents the cost associated with the 
single transformer (s) or common mode (c) faults in a sampled 
operating condition. This cost arises from two sources: 
disconnection of load and disconnection of generation (lost 
revenue).  
We first consider the case of a single transformer outage. If the 
instantaneous flows exceed the capacity of the remaining 
transformer, all loads and generating sites are disconnected 
until restorative actions have completed (time horizon 𝑞). 
Regardless of whether load is shed, two wind sites are always 
disconnected for the duration of transformer repair (time 
horizon 𝑟 ≥ 𝑞) to prevent excess flows at a later time. The 
associated costs can be summarised as 
𝑋𝑠(?⃗?𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖) = 𝜃(∑ 𝑔𝑖,𝑘
4
𝑘=1 − 𝑑𝑖 − 17𝑀𝑊) ×
(𝐶𝑑
𝑞(𝑑𝑖) + 2𝐶𝑔
𝑞(?⃗?𝑖)) + 2𝐶𝑔
𝑟(?⃗?𝑖)       
 (3) 
  
where 𝜃(𝑥) represents the unit step function that identifies 
overloads; it returns 1 when 𝑥 > 0 and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝑑
𝑧(𝑑𝑖) is 
the expected cost of disconnecting demand and 𝐶𝑔
𝑧(?⃗?𝑖) the 
expected lost revenue that results from disconnecting a single 
wind site for a duration 𝑧, where 𝑧 = (𝑞 or 𝑟).  
When a common mode outage occurs, all demand and 
generation is disconnected for the repair time 𝑟. Using the 
notation introduced above, this results in  
𝑋𝑐(?⃗?𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) = 𝐶𝑑
𝑟(𝑑𝑖) + 4𝐶𝑔
𝑟(?⃗?𝑖)         (4)   
We proceed to compute the expected cost of load shedding and 
generation curtailment. As we use randomly sampled states to 
compute the expected demand disconnection costs across a 
time horizon 𝑞 or 𝑟, we first identify the operating hours 𝒯(𝑑𝑖) 
in which the sampled demand value 𝑑𝑖 occurs within the annual 
demand profile 𝑑:  
𝒯(𝑑𝑖) = {𝑡: 𝑑(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑖}         (5)   
In each of the operating hours in 𝑡 ∈ 𝒯(𝑑𝑖), the cost associated 
with disconnected demand 𝑥𝑡
𝑧 is computed considering the 
demand not supplied during the horizon 𝑧 = (𝑞 or 𝑟) and the 
Value of Lost Load (VOLL). Therefore, 
𝑥𝑡
𝑧 =∑𝑑(𝑡 + 𝑗) ∙ Δ𝑡 ⋅ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐿
𝑧−1
𝑗=0
          ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝒯(𝑑𝑖)  (6) 
We can then compute the arithmetic average of the demand 
loss cost associated with every operating hour in 𝒯(𝑑𝑖) as 
𝐶𝑑
𝑧(𝑑𝑖) =
1
|𝒯(𝑑𝑖)|
∑ 𝑥𝑡
𝑧
𝑡∈𝒯(𝑑𝑖)
  (7) 
This approach to estimate impacts across the interval 𝑧 cannot 
be used for the cost of curtailed generation, because we have 
not used a chronological wind model. Instead, the lost revenues 
– which are substantially lower than the cost of load 
curtailment – are valued using the average wind generation 
level ?̅? computed from the historical hourly wind speed data. 
The expected lost revenue of a single wind site for a duration 
𝑧 is therefore 
𝐶𝑔
𝑧(?⃗?𝑖) = 𝐶𝑔
𝑧 = ?̅? ∙ 𝑧 ⋅Δ𝑡 ⋅ 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑅         (8) 
where 𝐿𝑂𝐺𝑅 stands for the loss of generation revenue 
(£80/MWh).  
  
4 Case studies 
The following case studies are based on simulations of 100,000 
samples generated according to the approach described in 
section 3.1. 
 
4.1 Effect of correlation between wind sites and demand 
This section aims to investigate the effect of the correlation 
parameters wind-wind and wind-demand of the model. Table 
1 shows the proportion of time in which the reverse flows 
exceed the capacity of a single transformer, exposing the 
system to disconnection in case of a fault in either transformer. 
In other words, the table shows the proportion of time in which 
the distribution system is exporting more than 17 MW. We 
consider a range of wind speed correlation parameters (0.8 and 
0.9; high values to reflect neighbouring sites), combined with 
a spread of wind-demand parameters (-0.3, 0 and 0.3). 
Additionally, we show two extreme scenarios. The first one 
assumes a perfect positive correlation between wind sites and 
a perfect negative correlation between these and the demand 
group. The second one considers that there is no correlation 
between wind sites and between these and the demand group. 
 
Table I: Exposure to disconnections for different values of 
correlation coefficients 
𝝆𝑾 𝝆𝑾,𝑫 % of time under 
reverse flow risk 
0 0 0.7 
0.8 0.3 7.8 
0.8 0 8.8 
0.9 0.3 9.1 
0.8 -0.3 9.7 
0.9 0 10 
0.9 -0.3 10.8 
1 -1 13.7 
 
Table II: Results for different values of correlation 
coefficients 
𝝆𝑾 𝝆𝑾,𝑫 Expected cost 
(£/year) 
Years between 
disconnections 
0 0 13,489 2,068 
0.8 0.3 27,369 303 
0.8 0 28,848 269 
0.9 0.3 30,080 260 
0.8 -0.3 30,195 245 
0.9 0 31,198 238 
0.9 -0.3 32,214 222 
1 -1 36,619 176 
 
The proportion of time in which the distribution system risks 
to be disconnected by a single transformer outage notably 
depends on the value of the correlation factors. Overall, higher 
values of 𝜌𝑊 and lower values of 𝜌𝑊,𝐷 result in larger exposure 
to disconnections. This finding is intuitive as this results in 
high generation levels at the wind farms occurring at the same 
time as low demand levels. In a hypothetical extreme scenario 
with  𝜌𝑊 = 1 and 𝜌𝑊,𝐷 = −1 the system is exposed 13.7% of 
the time. On the other hand, with no correlations involved 
(𝜌𝑊 = 0 and 𝜌𝑊,𝐷 = 0) the distribution system exposure is 
reduced to 0.7% of the time. For the rest of the case studies 
shown in Table I, the proportion of time under risk varies 
between these two extremes. We will use 𝜌𝑊 = 0.9 and 
𝜌𝑊,𝐷 = 0 as the base case for the rest of the paper. 
Table 2 shows further data for the same case studies, namely 
the annual expected disconnection costs per year and the 
expected number of years between disconnections.  
 
4.2 Effect of rapid transformer replacement 
This section describes the potential economic effect from 
reducing the time to replace faulty transformers. To this end, 
we analyse four scenarios with different VOLL values 
(£30000/MWh and £16000/MWh) and transformer 
replacement times (10 days and 1 day). The rest of the 
parameters are the default values specified in section 2.1.  
Figure 2. Expected interruption costs for different VOLL 
and transformer replacement times 
 
As shown in Fig. 2 the value of reducing the replacement time 
of the transformers from 10 days to 1 day is £10912/year and 
£7036/year for the different VOLL considered. These savings 
amount to 35% and 39% of the total expected cost respectively. 
Although the reduction is costs is substantial, it is not 
proportional to the reduction in repair times. The reason is our 
assumption that for a single transformer outage, the DNO is 
able to restore supply to customers in 24 hours (the first process 
described in section 2.1). Therefore, the savings achieved are 
related to the expected curtailments associated with the 2 wind 
farms that stay disconnected for 10 days until the faulty 
transformer is replaced.  
In case of a common mode fault of both transformers, 
disconnection and curtailment costs are incurred for the entire 
duration until repairs have been carried out. A reduction in 
repair time has very large effects on this scenario, but it is very 
unlikely and therefore has little impact in terms of expected 
costs.  
5 Risk mitigation based on corrective security 
In the previous section we have analysed the possibility of 
reducing the replacement time of faulty transformer from 10 
days to 1 day, having estimated around 35% savings on the 
expected annual interruption costs. However, the majority of 
the expected cost is caused by the initial disconnection of all 
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demand, which suggests that the most effective way to reduce 
the expected cost is to avoid demand disconnections. The 
impacts are characterised by infrequent but very costly events 
– even using moderate VOLL values. Although disconnections 
could be prevented by increasing the capacity of the 
transformers, or adding a third transformer, such preventive 
security measures are unlikely to be economically justified on 
the basis of their expected benefits, due to the very long 
recurrence times of disconnection events. In this section we 
investigate the use of an alternative corrective protection 
system in order to mitigate the risk exposure from reverse flow 
conditions.  
The protection scheme is intended to remotely disconnect 
distributed generation sites after a single transformer outage, in 
order to rapidly reduce the exporting power flow, thereby 
preventing overloads in the remaining transformer and thus the 
disconnection of the distribution system. Such a system can be 
implemented at a much lower cost than an additional 
transformer, which may make it worthwhile from an expected 
benefit perspective. Moreover, by preventing infrequent very 
costly events it is able to reduce the long tail of high-impact 
events. A common concern for the use of corrective actions is 
its potential to fail to respond as desired. To investigate the 
risks of such a system we additionally consider the case where 
it is not 100% dependable. The risk due to unreliability is 
modelled using the failure mode model introduced in [2, 3]. 
The failure modes of the protection system are summarised in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Failure model diagram of the protection scheme 
 
As illustrated, a fault in either transformer activates the 
protection system. It may be inhibited by a complete failure of 
the corrective protection system, representing the failure of the 
sensing relays and the logic controls aimed to identify the fault 
and initiate the trip signal. When this failure mode happens, 
none of the wind farms connected to the scheme are 
successfully disconnected. Under normal operations, the logic 
controls forward trip signals to the remote wind farms 
connected to the scheme. Figure 3 assumes connections to the 
four wind farms, but this number will be varied to investigate 
redundant designs of the scheme. The trip signals are 
transmitted through independent communication channels to 
each wind power site, where remote circuit breakers disconnect 
the targeted sites from the network. As represented in the 
figure, the communication channel and the circuit breaker of 
each farm constitutes an individual failure mode.  
Fig. 4 shows the expected annual interruption costs as a 
function of the number of wind sites connected to the scheme. 
A complete failure of the corrective action scheme is assumed 
to occur with a probability of 0.038 upon activation of the 
scheme [3]. The failures of each individual wind farm are set 
to 0.8 (black), 0.95 (red) and 0.99 (blue). In addition, a 
hypothetical 100% reliable protection system is included for 
comparison (green). The other system parameters are those 
specified in section 2.2. 
 
Figure 4: Expected interruption costs (£/year) for different 
number of wind farms connected to the protection system 
 
Figure 5: Time between interruptions (years) for different 
number of wind farms connected to the protection system 
 
The annual exposure decreases with the number of wind farms 
connected to the protection scheme, as more protection 
connections may counteract eventual failures to activate one or 
more tripping systems. Note a 100% dependable system (green 
curve) requires two tripping schemes to neutralise all the risk 
related to single transformer faults. This means that tripping 
one wind farm is not enough to reduce the flows within the 
transformer capacity for all the operating conditions. It should 
be noted that even for a very unreliable system (black curve), 
the annual expected interruption costs are reduced to around 
£13000/year. This signifies a savings of about 60% of annual 
savings when compared to the base case with no system 
protection. The protection system therefore permits the DNO 
to mitigate a great deal of the risk related to single transformer 
faults. The residual risk is due to common mode transformer 
outages where corrective actions have no impact. These costs 
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might be further reduced by speeding up transformer 
replacement as discussed in section 4.2. 
The protection system not only reduces the expected costs but 
also the number of years between interruptions of service. As 
shown in Fig. 5, these are notably improved when compared to 
the base case. Again, the most unreliable system considered in 
this case studies (black curve) increase this value up to 2462 
years when redundant intertripping channels are connected. 
More reliable systems reach up to 2820 years between 
costumer service interruptions. Eventually a perfect protection 
system ensures that only the common mode transformer faults 
results in the disconnection of the distribution system.  
6 Conclusions 
The connection of significant amounts of distributed 
generation may result in distribution nodes exporting power to 
other parts of the network. Moreover, the variable nature of 
end-user loads and the variability of especially renewable 
sources of generation (e.g. wind) may translate into power 
flows dynamically reversing according to different operating 
conditions. Although security standards (e.g. P2/6) are in place 
to ensure sufficient redundancy to supply demands under 
circuit outage conditions, these may not adequately protect 
against circuit outages in combination with significant reverse 
power flows.   
We have introduced a model distribution network to illustrate 
the risks associated with an increase of variable distributed 
generation to the point where reverse flows may exceed the 
connection capacity under circuit outage conditions. The 
model includes variable wind generation and demand which 
are connected to the rest of the network through two identical 
transformers. A novel sampling approach is introduced in order 
to qualitatively model correlations between the wind speed at 
different sites and between those and the aggregated demand 
at the distribution bus. We have also presented a simple fault 
and restoration model in order to compute annual expected 
interruptions costs related to post-fault overloading under 
reverse flow conditions.  
Monte Carlo simulations were used to estimate two reliability 
indexes: the expected costs from service interruptions and the 
expected time between service interruptions. Studies 
confirmed the intuition that risks due to reverse flows are 
greatest when the wind power output is highly correlated, and 
high wind occurs at times of low demand. Next, we 
investigated the potential economic benefits from reducing the 
time to replace faulty transformers and values for the Value of 
Lost Load. The scenarios analysed have shown savings of 
about 35% of the total expected cost from accelerating the 
repair time of transformers from 1 day to 30 days. However, 
frequency of service interruptions is not reduced by this 
strategy. Although faults with reverse power flows may result 
in costly customer disconnection events, their frequency of 
occurrence is low, meaning that traditional network 
reinforcements may not be economically justifiable.  
As a strategy to reduce the interruption frequency at a lower 
cost, we have investigated the use of a corrective protection 
system. The system consists of a remote tripping scheme that 
disconnects a set of pre-connected wind power sites upon 
occurrence of a transformer fault. The impact of such a 
corrective system has been quantified for different reliability 
levels, and the connection of redundant wind farms is 
investigated in order to improve the reliability indices. Our 
case studies conclude that even the most unreliable protection 
systems result in significant reductions in the exposure to risk. 
This suggests that in cases where reinforcement of the network 
is not economically justified, it is worthwhile investing in a 
low-cost corrective solution that results in significant savings 
even for moderate dependability levels.  
This paper has illustrated novel operational threats from an 
increase of variable distributed generation and the benefits 
associated with potential corrective protection measures. The 
results suggest that a scheme based on remote disconnection 
schemes may ensure large reductions in risk exposure, even 
when the corrective scheme itself is very unreliable.  
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